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This paper studies the identiﬁcation power of rationalizability in a simple dynamic
discrete game model. The paper extends to dynamic games some of the results in
Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2007). The most commonly used equilibrium concept in
empirical applications of dynamic games is Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). I study
the identiﬁcation of structural parameters when we replace the MPE assumption with
weaker conditions such as rational behavior or rationalizability. I present identiﬁcation
results for a simple dynamic game of market entry-exit with two players. Under the
assumption of level-2 rationalizability (i.e., players are rational and they know that
they are rational), exclusion restrictions and large-support conditions on the exoge-
nous explanatory variables are suﬃcient for point-identiﬁcation of all the structural
parameters. Though the model is fully parametric, the key identifying assumptions
are nonparametric in nature and it seems that these identiﬁcation results might be
extended to a semiparametric version of the model.
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Structural econometric models of individual or ﬁrm behavior typically assume that agents
are rational in the sense that they maximize expected payoﬀs given their subjective beliefs
about uncertain events. Empirical applications of game theoretic models have used stronger
assumptions than rationality. Most studies that have estimated games have used the Nash
equilibrium concept, or some of its reﬁnements, to explain agents’ strategic behavior. The
Nash equilibrium (NE) concept is based on assumptions on players’ knowledge and beliefs
which are more restrictive than rationality. Though there is not a set of necessary condi-
tions to generate the NE outcome, the set of suﬃcient conditions includes the assumption
that players’ actions are common knowledge.1 This assumption may be too restrictive or
unrealistic in some applications. Therefore, it seems relevant to study whether we can iden-
tify the parameters of empirical games under weaker conditions than NE. For instance, we
would like to know if rationality (together with mutual knowledge of payoﬀs) is suﬃcient for
identiﬁcation. It is also relevant to study the identiﬁcation power of other assumptions on
players’ knowledge which are stronger than rationality but weaker than NE, such as com-
mon knowledge rationality: i.e., everybody knows that players are rational; everybody knows
that everybody knows that players are rational, etc. The solution concepts iterated strict
dominance and rationalizability are closely related to the assumption of common knowledge
rationality (see chapter 2 in Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).
The paper by Andres Aradillas-Lopez and Elie Tamer (2007) is the ﬁrst study that deals
with these interesting identiﬁcation issues. The authors study the identiﬁcation power of
rational behavior and rationalizability in three classes of static games which have received
signiﬁcant attention in empirical applications: binary choice games, with complete and with
incomplete information, and auction games under the independent private values paradigm.
Their paper contributes to the literature on identiﬁcation of incomplete econometric mod-
1Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) have derived suﬃcient conditions on players’ knowledge and beliefs
to generate the NE as an outcome of a game. They show that mutual knowledge of the payoﬀ functions and
of rationality, and common knowledge of the conjectures (actions), imply that the conjectures form a NE.
1els, i.e., models which do not provide unique predictions on the distribution of endogenous
variables (see also Tamer, 2003, and Haile and Tamer, 2003). Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer’s
paper shows that standard exclusion restrictions and large-support conditions are suﬃcient
to identify structural parameters despite the non-uniqueness of the model predictions. Note
that, though structural parameters can be point-identiﬁed, when we use the estimated model
to perform counterfactual experiments we have that players’ behavior under the counterfac-
tual scenario is not point-identiﬁed. This problem also appears in models with multiple
equilibria. However, a nice feature of Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer’s rationalizability approach
is that, at least for the class of models that they consider, it is very simple to obtain bounds
for the model the predictions on players’ behavior.
T h em a i np u r p o s eo ft h i sp a p e ri st os t u d yt h ei d e n t i ﬁcation power of rational behavior
and rationalizability in a class of empirical games that has not been analyzed in Aradillas-
Lopez and Tamer’s paper: dynamic discrete games. Dynamic discrete games are of interest in
economic applications where agents interact over several periods of time and make decisions
that aﬀect both current and future payoﬀs. The most commonly used equilibrium concept in
applications of dynamic games is Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). As in the case of NE,
the concept of MPE is based on the assumption that players’ strategy functions are common
knowledge. Here I study the identiﬁcation of structural parameters when we replace the
MPE assumption with weaker conditions such as rational behavior or rationalizability.
I present identiﬁcation results for a simple dynamic game of market entry-exit with
two players. For this simple model the results are similar to the ones in Aradillas-Lopez
and Tamer’s paper for static games of incomplete information. Under the assumption of
level-2 rationalizability (i.e., players are rational and they know that they are rational),
exclusion restrictions and large-support conditions on the exogenous explanatory variables
are suﬃcient for point-identiﬁcation of all the structural parameters. Though the model is
fully parametric, the key identifying assumptions are nonparametric in nature and it seems
that these identiﬁcation results might be extended to a semiparametric version of the model.
22 Dynamic discrete games
2.1 Model and assumptions
There are two ﬁrms which decide whether to operate or not in a market. I use the indexes
i ∈ {1,2} and j ∈ {1,2} to represent a ﬁrm and its opponent, respectively. Time is discrete
an indexed by t.L e tYit ∈ {0,1} be the indicator of the event "ﬁrm i is active in the market
at period t". Every period t the two ﬁrms decide simultaneously whether to be active in




sΠi,t+s),w h e r eδ ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor and Πit is the ﬁrm’s proﬁt
at period t. The decision to be active in the market has implications not only on a ﬁrm’s
current proﬁts but also on its expected future proﬁts. More speciﬁcally, there is an entry
cost that should be paid only if a currently active ﬁrm was not active at previous period
(Yit =1and Yit−1 =0 ). Therefore, the lagged entry decision Yit−1 aﬀects current proﬁts and





Ziηi + γiYit−1 + αiYjt − εit if Yit =1
0 if Yit =0
(1)
Yjt represents the opponent’s decision. ηi, γi and αi are parameters. The parameter γi
represents ﬁrm i’s entry cost. The parameter αi ≤ 0 captures the competitive eﬀect. The
variable εit is private information of ﬁrm i. For the sake of simplicity, I assume that the
exogenous market and ﬁrm characteristics in Z1 and Z2 are constant over time. The vector
of parameters θ ≡ {ηi,γi,α i : i =1 ,2} and the vector of variables Z ≡ (Z1,Z 2) are common
knowledge. The variables ε1t and ε2t are independent of Z, independent of each other, and
independently and identically distributed over time. Their distribution functions, H1 and
H2, are absolutely continuous and strictly increasing with respect to the Lebesgue measure
on R.
32.2 Rational behavior and rationalizability
The literature on estimation of dynamic discrete games has used the concept of Markov
Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). This type of equilibrium assumes that: (1) players’ strategy
functions depend only on payoﬀ relevant state variables and they are constant over time
(Markov assumption); (2) players are forward looking, maximize expected intertemporal
payoﬀs and know their own strategy functions; and (3) players’ strategies are common
knowledge. The concept of rational behavior that I consider here maintains the assump-
tions (1) and (2) of Markov strategy functions and forward looking behavior. I relax con-
dition (3). In our game, the payoﬀ relevant state variables for player i are {Xt,ε it} where
Xt ≡ (Z1,Z 2,Y 1t−1,Y2t−1).L e t σi(Xt,ε it) be a strategy function for player i.G i v e n a
strategy function σi (Xt,ε it),w ec a nd e ﬁne a conditional choice probability (CCP) function
Pi(Xt) ≡
Z
I {σi (Xt,ε it)=1 }dHi (εit),w h e r eI{.} is the indicator function. It will be
convenient to represent players’ behavior using CCPs. Player i’s beliefs about the expected
behavior of his opponent can be represented as a CCP function Pj(Xt).
A strategy function σi(Xt,ε it) is rational if for every possible value of (Xt,ε it) the action
σi(Xt,ε it) maximizes player i’s expected and discounted payoﬀs given player i’s belief about
his opponent’s strategy. More formally, σi(Xt,ε it) is a rational strategy function if there is a










where the function v
Pj
i (Xt) represents the expected value of ﬁrm i if it is active today minus
its value if it is not active today given that: (1) current state is Xt;( 2 )ﬁrm i behaves
optimally in the future; and (3) ﬁrm i believes that its opponent’s CCP function is Pj.W e
denote v
Pj
i as the diﬀerential value function. For given Pj, the function v
Pj
i is implicitly
deﬁned as the unique solution of a contraction mapping. I do not present here the details
of the ﬁxed point mapping that deﬁnes v
Pj
i . Assumption M and Lemmas 1 and 2, below,
present several properties of the function v
Pj
i which are used to prove the identiﬁcation
4results. According to this deﬁnition of rational strategy, we say that a CCP function Pi is








Assumption M, below, establishes a monotonicity property of the diﬀerential value func-
tion in this game: if the opponent increases his probability of being active at some state X,
then the diﬀerential value v
Pj
i declines at any state. This monotonicity of the diﬀerential
value function with respect to Pj implies that the empirical implications of rationalizability
can be represented in terms of bounds on players’ choice probabilities. αi ≤ 0 is a necessary
condition for Assumption M to hold, but it is not suﬃcient.
ASSUMPTION M: Let PA
j and PB
j be two CCP functions such that PA
j (X) ≥ PB
j (X) for
any value of X. Then, v
PA
j
i (X) ≤ v
PB
j
i (X) for any value of X.
Assumption M has several implications. Let use {Pj =1 } to denote the CCP function
with Pj(X)=1for every value of X. And let’s use {Pj =0 } to denote the CCP function




i (X) ≤ v
Pj
i (X) ≤ v
{Pj=0}
i (X) (4)
If player i beliefs that his opponent will be active in the market with probability one under
any possible state, then this belief generates the lowest diﬀerential value and the lowest
probability of being active for player i. Similarly, if player i believes that he is a monopolist
without threat of entry, then this belief generates the largest diﬀerential value and the highest
probability of being active for player i. Therefore, if we do not know player i’s beliefs, we














A CCP function Pi is rationalizable of level 2 if there is a probability function Pj,w h i c h
represents player i’s belief about player j0s behavior, such that Pj is consistent with player
5j’s rational behavior, and Pi maximizes ﬁrm i0s expected value given his belief Pj.M o r e























We can use Assumption M to represent the restrictions of level-2 rationalizability as




j to denote the lower and upper bounds,
respectively, on player j’s CCPs given level-1 rationality: i.e., P
L,1














. Assumption M implies that for any Pj that satisﬁes player





i (X) ≤ v
Pj





Therefore, if we do not know player i’s beliefs, we can say that a strategy Pi is consistent


















It is straightforward to extend this result to level-k rationalizability. Under level-k ratio-
nalizability a strategy Pi should be between a lower bound P
L,k
i and an upper bound P
U,k
i


























2.3 Identiﬁcation under rationalizability
Suppose that we have a random sample of independent markets at some period t.F o re a c h
market in the sample we observe a realization of the variables {Y1t,Y 2t,Y 1t−1,Y 2t−1,Z 1,Z 2}.
6Notice that the variables Z1 and Z2 do not vary over time but they have sample variability
because they vary across markets. We are interested in using this sample to estimate the
vector of structural parameters θ ≡ {ηi,γi,α i : i =1 ,2}.
Let Xi be the vector of exogenous and predetermined explanatory variables (Zi,Y it−1).
And deﬁne βi ≡ (ηi,γi) such that Xiβi ≡ Ziηi + γiYit−1.A l s o ,d e ﬁne X ≡ (X1,X 2) and let
SX be the support of X. Consider the following conditions:
(C1) The variance-covariance matrixes V (X1) and V (X2) have full rank.
(C2) For any player i, there is a variable Xi  ⊂ Xi such that βi  6=0and condi-
tional on any value of the other variables in X , that we represent as (Xi(− ),X j),
the random variable {Xi |(Xi(− ),X j)} has unbounded support.
(C3) For any player i, αi ≤ 0 and Assumption M holds.
These assumptions are standard exclusion restrictions and large-support conditions on X.
T h ef o l l o w i n gL e m m a sa r eu s e di nt h ep r o o f so ft h ei d e n t i ﬁcation results.
LEMMA 1: For any Pj,t h ef u n c t i o nv
Pj
i (X) is strictly increasing in Xiβi.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
limXiβi→+∞ v
Pj
i (X)=+ ∞ and limXiβi→−∞ v
Pj
i (X)=−∞.
LEMMA 2: For any Pj, the function v
Pj
i (X) is strictly increasing in αi.
Let P0
i (X) be the true conditional probability function Pr(Yit =1 |Xt = X) in the
population. And let θ
0 be the true value of θ in the population. Level-k rationalizability















To prove point identiﬁcation of θ
0 we should show that for any vector θ 6= θ
0 there are values
of X ∈ SX for which the previous inequality does not hold: i.e., either P
L,k




i (X,θ) <P 0
i (X).
THEOREM 1 (Point identiﬁcation under level-1 rationalizability). Suppose that conditions
(C1)-(C3) hold and players are level-1 rational. Then, the parameters β
0
1  and β
0
2  are point-
identiﬁe d .T h er e s to ft h ep a r a m e t e r sm a yn o tb ep o i n t - i d e n t i ﬁed.
7PROOF: Suppose that θ is such that βi  6= β
0
i . By Assumption M, Lemma 1 and conditions
(C1) and (C2), for any value of (Xi(− ),X j) we can always ﬁnd a ﬁnite value of Xi ,t h a tw e
denote by X∗
i , such that v
{Pj=1}
i (X∗
i ,X i(− ),X j;θ)=v
{Pj=0}
i (X∗
i ,X i(− ),X j;θ
0).I fβi  >β
0
i ,
then for values of X with Xi  >X ∗



















Similarly, if βi  <β
0
i ,t h e nf o rv a l u e so fX with Xi  <X ∗

















i (X). Q.E.D. ¥
THEOREM 2 (Point identiﬁcation under level-2 rationalizability). Suppose that conditions
(C1)-(C3) hold and that players are rational and they know that they are rational. Then,
all the structural parameters in θ
0 are point-identiﬁed.
PROOF: The proof goes through three cases which cover all the possible values of θ with
θ 6= θ
0.
Case (i): Suppose that θ is such that βi  6= β
0
i . By Assumption M, Lemma 1 and conditions
(C1) and (C2), for any value of (Xi(− ),X j) we can always ﬁnd a ﬁnite value of Xi ,t h a t
we denote by X∗










i ,X i(− ),X j;θ
0).I fβi  >β
0
i ,
then for values of X with Xi  >X ∗


























Similarly, if βi  <β
0
i , then for values of X with Xi  <X ∗








Case (ii): Suppose that θ is such that (β1  = β
0
1 ) and (β2  = β
0
2 ) but βi(− ) 6= β
0
i(− ).B y
condition (C1), there should be some value of Xi(− ) for which Xi(− )
¡





Given this value of Xi(− ), by condition (C2) we can ﬁnd a value of Xj  (either large or small
enough, depending on the sign of β
0
j ) such that both P
U,1





















































holds because Xi(− )βi(− ) >
Xi(− )β
0
i(− ) and Lemma 1.
Case (iii): Suppose that θ is such that β1 = β
0
1 and β2 = β
0
2 but αi 6= α0
i. Suppose that
αi >α 0
i. By condition (C2) we can make Xjβ
0
j large enough such that P
L,1
j (X,θ
0) ' 1 and
P
U,1
j (X,θ) ' 1. Then, given that αi >α 0
i,b yL e m m a2w eh a v et h a t :
P
L,2



















Suppose that αi <α 0
i. By condition (C2) we can make Xjβ
0
j large enough such that
P
L,1
j (X,θ) ' 1 and P
U,1
j (X,θ
0) ' 1. Then, given that αi <α 0






















i (X) Q.E.D. ¥
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